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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE ^
STATE OF UTAH

GEORGE W. FLICK,

*

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

*

Case No.

*

14154

GLEN VAN TASSELL and VAN'S SERVICE,*
INC., a Utah corporation,
*

Defendants and Appellants.

SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY BRIEF
INTRODUCTION
This Supplemental Reply Brief is filed pursuant to
the Order of Chief Justice Henriod dated February 6, 1976,
permitting appellants to file a brief going beyond the issues
raised by the appellants1 brief in chief and also allowing
supplemental Affidavits.

This Supplemental Brief and accompany-

ing Affidavits are prepared for the purpose of setting forth
appellants1 contentions that they were denied adequate counsel
during the trial and initial appeal of this matter because of
the gross negligence of the two attorneys representing appellants.
It is further contended by appellants that this conduct has been
concealed from the record of, this case by these attorneys and
it is therefore necessary to supplement the record in order for
the truth to be known.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This was originally an action brought against the
defendants by the plaintiff for the return of certain sums of
money advanced to defendants and for damages sustained as an
alleged result of violation of Utah securities laws.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court, Judge Ronald C. Hyde, granted
default judgment to plaintiff on March 19, 1974 in the amount
of $263,561.00.

(R. 178). A Motion to Set Aside the Default

was made by appellants on April 1, 1975 (R. .180-182) and the
trial court denied this Motion on May 13, 1975 (R. 217) and
entered its Order on June 3, 1975. (R. 230). The Notice of
Appeal in this case was filed on June 11, 1975 and erroneously
referred to the Order as a "Motion for New Trial" and erroneously
referred to the date as May 13 1975 rather than June 3, 197 5.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants-appellants seek an Order setting aside the
default entered against defendants on March 26. 1975 or, in the
alternative, remand of this case to the trial court for further
proceedings as to the grounds for setting aside the judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants' new counsel in preparing this Supplemental
Brief believe that the facts relating to the original lawsuit are
basically immaterial to the issue on this appeal except for the
purpose of showing that a valid defense does exist and that

• - 2 -
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should the case be remanded for a new trial it would not be
a waste of judicial time.

These defenses are discussed in

appellants' brief in chief at pages 2, 3 and 8.

In addition,

it should be noted that a Counterclaim was filed by defendant
Glen Van Tassell against plaintiff which has never been decided
by the trial court in any of the proceedings.

(R. 116).

The main concern of appellants' new counsel is the
conduct and gross negligence of appellants' former counsel during
the discovery period, during trial, post-trial motions, and
the initial appeal to this Court.
In December of 1973 defendant Glen Van Tassell was
served with the Complaint.

(Affidavit of Glen Van Tassell, 1M[ 1

and 2 -- Hereinafter referred to as Glen Affidavit — ; R. 1-3).
Immediately upon receipt of this pleading defendant contacted
attorney-at-law Boyd Fullmer to represent him.
During this period of time defendant Van Tassell spent
most of his days in Bancroft, Idaho in the Bancroft, Idaho
vicinity, but was able to communicate with his Bountiful residence
by telephone.

He was within three to four hours of traveling

time between each location (Glen Affidavit 1[3) • While in Idaho
his wife informed him by telephone that she had been served with
papers from a Constable and defendant Van Tassell instructed her
to immediately deliver these papers to Mr. Fullmer.

(Glen

Affidavit 1(4; Affidavit of Erma Van Tassell 113 —Hereinafter

-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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referred to as Erma Affidavit.)

Defendant was never personally

aware of any date other than February 4, 1974 for the taking of
his deposition, at which time he attended.
114.)

(Glen Affidavit

In fact, however, notices of depositions were given on

January 21, 1974 and January 11, 1974 (R. 11, 13) and sanctions
were requested by plaintiff's attorney on January 23, 1974 for
defendant's failure to attend.

(R. 18).

At the deposition of February 4th Mr. Fullmer informed
plaintiff's counsel that he would turn over to plaintiff's
counsel certain mining contracts.

Defendant had previously given

all copies of such contract to Mr. Fullmer and had no copies
in his possession at that time.

(Glen Affidavit 1[5.)

Defendant

was unaware that Mr. Fullmer had failed to turn over such contracts as described in the Affidavit of plaintiff's attorney dated
June 24, 1974.

(R. 34).

Defendant did not request Mr. Fullmer to represent to
the court that an extension was necessary because of defendant's
cattle business (R. 24) since it was always inconvenient for
defendant to leave his ranch at all times, since only he and his
son were running the operation.

(Glen Affidavit, 1M[ 3 and 4) .

On June 24, 1974 plaintiff submitted his "First Set
of Interrogatories to Defendant Glen Van Tassell".

These

Interrogatories are critical to this appeal since the failure to
answer them was one basis for the default entered against defendants.

Defendant was never informed of the existence of these
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Interrogatories until the early part of March, 197 5.

He was

never requested to supply any information to answer these
Interrogatories.

(Glen Affidavit, 1M[ 6 and 20).

Defendant was never informed that an Order on July
15, 1974 issued by Judge Swan compelled him to produce certain
financial records, contracts, and tax returns and that an award
of $100.00 attorney's fee was entered,

(R, 50-51).

Defendant and his wife left for a world tour in July
and August of 1974.

Fullmer, however, knew about this trip

for three months prior to their leaving and defendants consulted
Fullmer and were told that there was nothing for them to do and
that they should leave as scheduled.

(Glen Affidavit, 1[12) .

This is contrary to Fullmerfs Affidavit, who used their trip
as an excuse for failing to produce.

(R. 55) .

Defendant Van Tassell received no notification by Mr.
Fullmer that Judge Gould on September 30, 1974 had entered an
Order, by stipulation, that defendant was to answer the June
24th Interrogatories not later than October 20, 1974,

(R.

74-75; Glen Affidavit, 1f9) .
On October 17, 1974 plaintiff's attorney submitted
Request for Production and Request for Admission to Mr. Fullmer.
Defendant was not informed that these requests were made. Defendant did not authorize Mr. Fullmer to object to these documents
because of defendant's presence in Idaho and would have been
willing to come to Utah upon Mr. Fullmer's request that the
documents be supplied and the questions be answered.

-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(Glen

Affidavit, 1f 1( 10 and 11) . Once again, however, Fullmer
represented that the distance justified delay.

(R. 94).

Defendant was never informed by Mr, Fullmer that
plaintiff's attorney was moving again for sanctions for failure
to answer the June 24th Interrogatories, by requesting a default
judgment be entered and by requesting that $800,00 attorney's
fees be awarded,

(R. 102; Glen Affidavit, 1(12) . Likewise,

defendant was not informed by Mr. Fullmer that a subsequent
Order by Judge Swan on December 18, 1974 ordered that sanctions
be imposed if defendant failed to answer the Interrogatories,
Admissions and produce the documents requested in October.
(R. 120; Glen Affidavit 1114),
During this period defendant requested Fullmer to file
a claim against plaintiff for the $200,000.00 remaining to be
paid to Van Tassell on the mining claims, for half of the amount
necessary to perform the annual assessment work, and for defamation of defendant's character by plaintiff.

Fullmer informed

defendant that a Counterclaim had been filed concerning all of
these claims.

(Glen Affidavit 1(13) . In fact, however, only the

libel claim was filed against plaintiff.

(R, 116-117) •

Defendant never received or was notified that plaintiff's
counsel again made a Motion to Strike defendant's Answer or for
failing to respond to the discovery as ordered by the Court
(R. 143; Glen Affidavit, 1115).
Plaintiff's counsel sent to Fullmer and to defendant
a "Notice to Appoint Counsel".

Defendant, however, did not

-6-
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personally receive this notice since it was sent to his
residence in Bountiful while he was in Idaho.

In a

telephone conversation between defendant in Idaho and
his wife in Utah, defendant advised her to take this document
to Mr. Fullmer.

It is probable the letter was not even opened.

At that time it is believed that defendant's daughter personally
delivered the document to Mr. Fullmer.

(R. 149; Glen Affidavit,

1(16; Erma Affidavit, f,[1[ 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8; Affidavit of Joy Van
Tassell, 1M[ 2 and 3).
During the middle or latter part of February Mr. Fullmer
informed defendant that Fullmer did not have sufficient time to
devote to the trial of this case which was supposed to occur in
the latter part of March.
obtained.

He suggested that another attorney be

Defendant agreed to get another attorney and Fullmer

recommended Mr. Reed Tuft.

(Glen Affidavit, 1[19) .

In the latter part of February or early part of March
a meeting was held with Fullmer and Tuft at which time Tuft
agreed to take the case if he could be paid at least $2,000.00.
Defendant agreed to this and subsequently the file was delivered
to Tuft including the Interrogatories, Admissions, and Request
for Production of Documents.

It was during this time that

defendant was shown these documents for the first time by Mr.
Fullmer and told by Mr. Tuft not to answer them since a continuance
would be granted by the trial court.

(Glen Affidavit, 1[1[ 19 and :

20).
-7-
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On March 4, 1975 Judge Thornley Swan denied
Fullmer1s Motion to continue the trial for the purpose of
obtaining new counsel, and set a firm date.

(R. 151, 153).

Defendant was not informed by Fullmer that the court granted
until March 14th the time to respond to the Request for Admissions filed in October or that the failure to respond would
deem such request admitted.

(R. 153; Glen Affidavit 1121).

On March 5, 197 5 Fullmer made a Motion for Withdrawal
of Attorney.

(R. 152). On March 12, 1975 plaintiff's attorney

again sent notice to Fullmer that he would move for a default
on March 19th for failure to respond to the Interrogatories,
Admissions, and produce documents.
of this notice.

Defendant was never notified

(Glen Affidavit, 1122).

Between the early part of March and March 19th defendant
repeatedly contacted both Mr. Tuft and Mr. Fullmer,
told by Fullmer to do whatever Tuft requested.

He was

Tuft informed

him that it would be unnecessary for him to attend the March
19th hearing and told him to tell anyone whol asked that it was
his understanding it was a pretrail.

On several occasions defen-

dant went to Tuft's office to assist in the trial, but was only
asked on each occasion whether he had more money for Tuft.
Finally, he was able to raise a total of $1,700,00 which was paid
to Tuft. (Glen Affidavit 1(23) .
On or about March 18th defendant contacted Mr. Fullmer
and asked him if he needed to attend the hearing on the 19th.

-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Fullmer said he should not attend if Tuft had told him not
to attend.

Fullmer stated it was his understanding, having talked

with Tuft, that defendant was not to come to the proceeding.
Defendant also called Tuft, who again told him not to worry
about the March 19th hearing and to be sure to say that it was
his understanding that the March 19th proceeding was a pretrial
if anyone asked.

Defendant did not know the distinction be-

tween a pretrial and trial.

Tuft told defendant that he would

take care of anything that happened and would let defendant
know after the hearing.

Defendant presumed that Tuft would

appear personally at the hearing.

(Glen Affidavit, If24) .

On March 17, 1975 Tuft mailed a copy of a Petition to
Appear as Counsel to Fullmer, Findlay and the Court, but made
no other personal attempt to gain appearance.

(R. 156). It

was filed in the Clerk's office on March 19, 197 5 —

the day

of trial.
It was evidentally the purpose of Tuft to prevent the
trial court from setting a continuance of one or two weeks. He
reasoned that by carefully planning his appearance with Fullmer's
withdrawal that Van Tassell would be left with no counsel and
that the Court would, therefore, grant a long continuance,
(Affidavit of Robert Sykes 1[5 —
Affidavit).

hereinafter referred to as Syfces

Tuft was surprised when a default rather than a

continuance was entered (Syk.es Affidavit, ^[7) #

-9-
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On March 19th, the day of the trial, defendant was
at his Bountiful residence and was available for trial had
he been notified by his counsel to attend*
K24).

(Glen Affidavit,

On March 19th trial was commenced before the Honorable

•Ronald C. Hyde with plaintiff being represented by Joseph
Henriod and Bruce Findlay, and defendant not being present
but with an appearance by Boyd Fullmer.

(R. 159). At this

hearing Mr. Fullmer represented to the Court the following:
"I talked to my client as late as Thursday. The answers to these requests for admissions
and interrogatories and the production of documents were due Friday, last Friday, and he was
aware of that as late as last Thursday without
my prompting him; and I advised him that he had
to have those in. I talked to him as late as
yesterday and told him that if the court allowed
me to withdraw this morning I would withdraw
and not further participate in the case. I think
he's fully aware," (P. 2, Mar. 19, 197 5 hearing.)
When asked if the defendant was personally aware of the setting
Fullmer replied:
"Yes. Mr, Tuft is and Mr. Van Tassell is.
They are both aware of this. Mr. Findlay and
I have both received the notice of Mr. Tuft to
enter his appearance as counsel for the defendant.
. . . I do so desire to withdraw. I don't have the
file. I don't feel that on memory I should attempt
to try this case, and I feel that whatever I could
do at this moment, with the file in the hands
of the other counsel, would be a disservice to the
other counsel." (P. 3, Mar. 19, 1975 hearing.)
Upon Mr. Fullmer's representation he was allowed to
withdraw from the case and the trial proceeded in the absence of
any attorneys or opposition.

Evidence was then offered by the
-10-
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plaintiff and a judgment was granted as prayed for in the
amount of $265,561.55 plus interest of 6%,

(R, 159)f

Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law together with the Judgment were
subsequently entered by the trial court,

(R, 160-178)n
•}

On the day following the trial defendant called
Tuft and asked him what had developed.

Tuft informed him

that the hearing was under advisement and that the defendant
should call him in three or four days,

Defendant was unclear

as to what was under advisement but Tuft would be no more
specific.

(Glen Affidavit 1(25) , Several days later defendant

called Boyd Fullmer who informed him that a judgment had been
entered upon the day of trial.

Defendant was understandably

upset and immediately called Tuft, who confirmed that the
judgment had been entered but reassured defendant that it would
be set aside, and told defendant not to worry, that Tuft would
take care of everything.

Tuft informed defendant that he would

have to send him more money, however, at that time,

(Glen

Affidavit, 1(26) .
On April 1st defendant went to the offices of Reed Tuft
.to sign a document entitled "Motion to Met Aside Default Judgment".
(R. 180-182).

On this occasion defendant asked Tuft why it

was stated that his residence was in Idaho and Tuft explained
that residence was a technicality and that it was proper to
say this.

He told Tuft that it was rare he could not be reached

by telephone, but Tuft said not to be concerned about it.
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(Glen Affidavit, 1[28) .

He also informed Tuft that he did

not consider a communication problem existed with Fullmer or
that there was any tension as stated in the document.

Tuft

informed defendant that this was Fullmer's view and Tuft's
view, and that defendant should not worry about this either.
(Glen Affidavit, 1(29) . Defendant was then told to sign this
document, but did not understand what effect the signature
could be given.

(Glen Affidavit, 1(31) . At this time he stated

to Tuft and Sykes that he had not been told by anyone to be
in Court on March 19th.

(Sykes Affidavit, 1(7).

Around April 23rd defendant was informed by Tuft to
go to the Davis County Courthouse where a hearing would be held
to set aside the Judgment.

He informed defendant not to worry,

that everything would be taken care of.

(Glen Affidavit, 1(32) .

Despite the suggestions of Sykes, a lawyer associated
with Tuft and working on the case, Tuft instructed John Marshall
to handle the argument.

Marshall was quickly briefed by Sykes

shortly before arriving at the courthouse.

(Sykes Affidavit,

1H8 and 9) .
On April 24th defendant met Tuft, John Marshall, Tuft's
partner, and Robert Sykes, an associate of Tuft and Marshall, at
the courthouse doors. At this time Marshall stated that he was
not prepared to adequately handle it.

Tuft told Marshall that it

would work better with Tuft not present and that Marshall should
do the best he could.

Tuft told defendant, as they were proceed-

ing into the courthouse, to be sure to mention that the March
-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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19th proceeding was a pretrial.

(Glen Affidavit/ If32) .

A hearing was held by Judge Hyde at this time on the
Motion to Set Aside the Judgment with defendant Van Tassell and
Boyd Fullmer both testifying.

Mr. Marshall asked Van Tassell

certain questions designed to show confusion on the part of
defendant.

Defendant testified throughout, however, that he

was told that he did not need to come for trial, and that he
did not know the difference between a pretrial and a trial.
(P. 13 of April 24 hearing).

No testimony was taken to the

reasons for delaying the discovery, or as to the conversations
and conduct between Mr. Tuft and defendant.. In the opinion of
Mr. Sykes, because of Mr. Marshall's ignorance of the facts
and law he was unable to properly show the conduct of defendant
and his attorney as it related to discovery delays, and failed
to attend trial.

(Sykes Affidavit,flfl10 and 11).

He did not

believe that the Court was fully advised as to what had actually
occurred. (Sykes Affidavit, 1[11) .
On May 13, 197 5 Judge Hyde issued a Memorandum Decision
denying the Motion to Vacate and an Order was entered accordingly
on June 3, 1975.

(R. 216-217, p. 230).

Shortly thereafter Tuft informed defendant that he would
not represent him any further unless defendant would give him
a $25,000.00 mortgage on defendant's property.

When defendant

refused, Tuft informed him that he should seek other counsel.
(Glen Affidavit, 1(34).

Thereafter, defendant contacted Mr.

-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Fullmer, who said he would represent him on appeal.

(Glen

Affidavit, p. 35). Defendant paid to Fullmer approximately
$5,000.00 to handle this litigation from its inception to the
filing of the appellants1 brief.

(Glen Affidavit, 1(34).

Since March 19, 1975 there have been a total of less
than $5,000.00 in judgments outstanding against defendants,
and the amount of potential awards now in litigation is
$10,000, even assuming maximum recoveries.
assets greatly exceed these amounts.

Defendants' present

(Glen Affidavit, 11 ) .

The law firm of Worsley, Snow & Christensen was retained
after the appellee's brief had been submitted to the Court and
application was made to the Court for permission to file this
Supplemental Brief and Affidavit.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires
the setting aside of a judgment when such judgment was obtained
by the gross neglect and negligence of the attorneys representing
the injured party.
Appellants submit that this case is a classic of the coverup schemes so predominant with the Watergate investigation.
This case involves an instance where defendant Van Tassell hired
two separate attorneys who he believed were competent and would
do whatever necessary to protect his interests but who neglected
and purposely conducted themselves against Van Tassell. These
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

same attorneys were the ones who established the record in the
lower court and who carefully kept the facts from becoming
known to the trial court as to the grounds why the default
judgment should be set aside.

For these reasons, this is

an extraordinary case which requires this Court to correct
an intollerable injustice.
Appellants would submit that the trial court was correct
in its finding that the evidence submitted to it did not
justify a conclusion of "excusable neglect" as required by
Subsection 1 of Rule 60(b).

The facts in this case clearly

show that the neglect to answer the Interrogatories, Admissions,
and to produce the documents was in no way "excusable."
Likewise, the failure of defendant or counsel to be at the
March 19 trial was also not "excusable."

Thus, the failure

of discovery and the failure to attend trial constituted
complete disregard for the judicial process and should not
be tollerated by any court.

Appellants state for the record

that they believe both the trial court and the attorneys for
Respondent were more than fair in giving Appellants every
opportunity to remedy the discovery failure.

The record

shows that the Court gave Appellantsf counsel numerous
opportunities to comply with the requests of Respondent's
counsel, but that in each case the opportunities were ignored.
The persons who constituted a threat to the judicial process
were not the Appellants in their individual or corporate
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capacity but were rather the attorneys representing Appellants.
These individuals completely ignored their duty to their client
and forgot their function as officers of the judicial system.
It is well settled that a client is entitled to relief
from the gross neglect and negligence of his attorneys when
no showing of prejudicial harm can be made to third parties.
Rule 60(b) (7) states the following:
"Upon motion and upon such terms as are just,
the Court may in the futherance of justice relieve
a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons (7) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment."
Subdivision 7 is identical to subdivision 6 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and is identical to other rules of surrounding
states.

For this reason, references made in the following

cases may be to different subdivision numbers but they are
referring to the exact language contained in subdivision 7 of
the Utah Rules.
In King v. Mordowanec, 46 F.R.D. 474 (D. R. I. 1969) the
Court granted a motion made by plaintiff's new attorney some
one and one-half years after an action had been dismissed with
prejudice on the grounds that plaintiff's former attorney
committed such gross neglect of plaintiff's case that justice
required the reinstatement of the claim.

The Court stated:

"[G]ross neglect of a lawyer in failing to
prosecute his client's case is beyond Rule 60(b)(1)
and, hence, within Rule 60(b)(6), as long as the
client is unaware of and does not share in his
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lawyer's negligence."
Because the plaintiff in the King case had not been notified
of his attorney's neglect of his case until it was discovered
subsequently that it had been dismissed, the District Court
stated:
"It would be the practice of this Court to
notify clients, where possible, of their lawyer's
dilatoriness in cases such as this and to use the
fine as a means of enforcing the Court's rule
rather than to use the dismissal as a means of
visiting upon the often innocent client the sins
of his attorney." Id at 478-579.
In Transport Pool Division v. Joe Jones Truck Company,
319 F. Supp. 1308 (D. Geo. 1970) the Court set aside a default
judgment when it was obtained because of the gross neglect of
the defendant's counsel.

The Court stated:

"[T]he reason and answer was not filed in the first
place and the reason the motion was not filed in
the second was not the neglect of Jones but the
gross and inexcusable neglect of his counsel. At
least one other court has held that dismissal
resulting from counsel's inexcusable neglect does
not amount to a dismissal for plaintiff's excusable
neglect and thus is not within the one year limit
of Rule 60(b) . . . . Here the defendant was an uneducated laymen. He does not read well and even after
patient explanation has difficulty comprehending the
involutions of a legal proceeding. . . . Certainly
justice requires that in the circumstances of this
case this default judgment be set aside." Id. at
1311-1312
In Steuart v. Matthews, 329 F.2d 234 (D. C. Cir. 1964)
the Circuit Court upheld a lower court's decision allowing
the reinstatement of a complaint after it had been dismissed
for over two years with prejudice.

The Court in this case
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stated as to the conduct of plaintiff's attorney:
"But the District Court did not act on the
theory on excusable neglect. On the contrary, it
expressly applied the 'catch-all rule' 60(b)(6).
Counsel's neglect was not excusable and the Court,
by clear implication, so found. The judge said
he felt 'that in this particular case the client,
plaintiff, a person unfamiliar with court procedures,
should not be penalized by the action of his counsel,
who admittedly did not attend to the matter when
he received notice of the contemplated dismissal."
Id. at 235.
State Courts have also granted relief from the inexcusable
neglect and negligence of an attorney.

In Treadaway v. Meador,

436 P.2d 902 (Ariz. 1968) the court held that the trial court
abused its discretion in failing to set aside a judgment of
dismissal entered for failure of the plaintiffs to answer
Interrogatories.

The Supreme Court found that the plaintiff

had engaged an attorney and had fully attempted to comply with
the Court's directions to answer the interrogatories but that
the attorney himself failed to answer them.

In addition, the

attorney was subsequently disbarred for his conduct in this and
similar cases.:
In Dudley v. Keller, 521 P.2d 175 (Colo. 1974) the Court
upheld a lower court's determination that a default judgment
of $50,000 should be set aside because of the inexcusable
neglect on the part of the defendant's former counsel.

Counsel

in this case failed to answer a Complaint and failed to attend
a hearing at which time default judgment was entered.
Court stated:
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The

"Gross negligence on the part of counsel
resulting in a default judgment is considered
excusable neglect on the part of the client
entitling him to have the judgment set aside."
Finally, in Coeber v. Rath, 435 P.2d 228 (Colo. 1967) the
Supreme Court of Colorado reversed a lower court's refusal
to set aside a default judgment granted upon the failure to
answer interrogatories.
above.

This case is very similar to the case

The representations made to the client in that case

were similar to those made here.

The Court quoted the testi-

mony of the client in the Coeber case:
"And Mr. Morgan went on to say, 'Don't
worry about this.1 He said, 'I will go to court
to protect your interests. . . . And at the
time I had no idea what interrogatories and
pleadings were. . . and he said that if he needed
anything he would get in touch with us. . . . I
contacted Mr. Morgan after that. I don't remember
how soon after that, just to ask him if he had
gotten these papers (the interrogatories) and he
said that he had. That was the extent of my
conversation with Mr. Morgan. And I, of course,
assumed he was taking care of it." IdL 230.
And commenting upon the facts of this case as related to the
Rule 60(b) motion the court stated:
"In the instant case the defendants had alleged
a meritorious defense; the case was at issue before
the entry of the default judgment. From the foregoing
factual recitation, it is clear that defendant's
counsel was negligent. That neglect was the primary
cause for the defendants' failure to answer the
interrogatories. Counsel neglect was inexcusable
but, under the circumstances here, this neglect should
not be imputed to the defendants."
The Trial Court, in the Coeber case while denying the relief
to the clients submitted a letter to the Bar Association
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requesting that an investigation be conducted of the attorney's
conduct.

The Supreme Court in commenting upon this letter

said:
"It is obvious from this letter that although
the Court recognized the gross neglect of counsel,
yet, by its very action, it punished the defendants,
whose only dereliction was the misplacing of
confidence in their attorney. There is nothing
to indicate that setting aside the default and
ordering a trial on the merits would unwarrantedly
prejudice the plaintiffs. . ." idL 232
Thus, the rules clearly provide for the setting aside of
default judgments when such judgments were obtained by the
gross neglect and negligence of the defendant's counsel.
Examining the record in this case reveals the following:
1.

That sanctions were brought against appellants

for failure to attend two depositions in January of 1974 when
Mr. Fullmer failed to inform defendant, residing principally
in Idaho, of the dates of said depositions.

As in the

Coeber case, Van Tassell automatically sent all papers and
documents to his attorney, Boyd Fullmer, with the presumption
that Fullmer would advise him what to do.

This presumption

was obviously incorrect.
2.

As early as July 15, 1974, an Order was entered

by Judge Swan requiring the production of certain documents
and a fee of $100.00 to be paid to plaintiff's attorney.

The

rest of these documents were retained by Boyd Fullmer and
out of the control of Van Tassell. Van Tassell was never advised of
this Order nor of the $100.00 fine.
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3.

On June 24, 1974, a set of interrogatories were

served upon Mr. Fullmer.
answered.

These interrogatories were never

On September 30 an Order was entered to answer the

interrogatories or sanctions would be imposed.

A similar

Order was made on December 18, 1974, and March 5, 1975, and
a motion was made by Mr. Findley on March 12 to enter default
if discovery was not completed.

During this time, Mr.

Fullmer used the excuse of defendant's presence in Idaho and
his unavailability during a world tour even though defendant
was always reachable by telephone and within four hours of
Salt Lake and even though Fullmer had three months' notice
of the world tour trip.
4.

On October 17, 1974, plaintiff served Request

for Admissions and Request for Production of Documents upon
Mr. Fullmer.

None of these admissions or documents were

ever answered or produced.

Van Tassell was not informed of

these admissions or requests until March of 1975 and then
was told not to worry about them.

He was not told about the

December 18 Order requiring that the Admissions be answered,
nor the March 4 Order that all Admissions would be deemed
admitted unless answered by March 14.
5.

Within approximately 30 days before the trial

date, Fullmer informed Van Tassell that Fullmer did not have
time to represent him in the trial. Vantassal agreed to
obtain Reed Tuft and the file was turned over to Mr. Tuft.
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Mr. Tuft was made aware of these discovery requests but told
Mr. Van Tassell not to worry since a continuance would be
granted.
6.

During the month of March, Van Tassell was told

by both Fullmer and Tuft that the March 19 hearing was a
pretrial and to tell anyone who asked that that was his
understanding.

It was obviously Tuft's intention to protect

himself by alleging confusion in the event that his strategy
for delaying the trial did not work out.
7.

That on the eve of trial Van Tassell asked both

Fullmer and Tuft whether he should appear at the "pretrial"
hearing.
appear.

He was told by both of them not to worry and not to
Tuft then sent in a Notice of Appearance two days

before the trial so that it would not arrive until the day
of trial.

Tuft's strategy as explained by an associate in

his firm (Sykes' affidavit) was to get a long continuance
rather than a two week continuance which was commonly granted
in such cases.
8.

On the date of trial, Mr. Fullmer correctly

advised the Court that Van Tassell had been made aware of the
Admissions and Interrogatories and correctly advised the
Court that Fullmer had told Van Tassell that Fullmer would
withdraw from the case.

Mr. Fullmer incorrectly stated,

however, that Van Tassell was made aware of the serious
consequences of failing to answer these documents or that
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he was aware that Tuft would not be appearing to represent him.
No effort was made by the Trial Court to contact Van Tassell
personally or to contact Mr. Tuft.

Thus, the half truths

of Mr. Fullmer seemingly convinced the Trial Court that
Van Tassell had failed to cooperate and was willing to be
liable for a $300,000 judgment against him and waive a valid
claim of $200,000 against Mr. Flick.
9.

It was several days after the judgment had been

entered before Van Tassell learned of the judgment by calling
Mr. Fullmer, not Mr. Tuft.

Even in spite of the judgment,

Tuft was evidently confident that the Trial Court would
overturn the default judgment using his "confusion" theory.
10.

Tuft prepared an affidavit for Van Tassell with

several inaccuracies but convinced him that they were
"technicalities" or points which did not matter and Van Tassell
signed the Motion not understanding that he was in effect
testifying.

The Motion itself is improper since it includes

legal argument and facts not known to Van Tassell personally.
Evidently, Tuft was hesitant in signing a Motion himself for
fear of the consequences.
11.

On March 22, Tuft obtained an Order from the

Court allowing him to represent Van Tassell.

Tuft and Marshall

argued to the Trial Court that they had some confusion in
thinking that a formal order of entry had to be made separately
from a withdrawal of counsel.

This again, according to the
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Affidavit of Robert Sykes who was associated with Tuft at
that time, was a method of protecting Tuft from appearing
at the trial.
12.

On April 24, 1975, the date of the hearing to

set aside the judgment, Tuft delegated this important task
involving Van Tassell's $300,000 to John Marshall, his partner,
who had had little connection with the case. Marshall, in
turn, relied upon the briefing by Robert Sykes of the pertinent
facts and law of the case even though Sykes had not even
entered the firm until after the default judgment was obtained.
Marshall was forced to proffer testimony of Tuft as to the
explanation of his conduct in not appearing.
of April 24, 1975).

(Page 27 Transcript

Mr. Van Tassell testified at this hearing that

Fullmer had specifically told him not to come for the trial
(page 13) and that he had been told that "this trial coming
up was a pretrial" (page 11). He also stated he did not know
the difference between a trial and a pretrial (page 13).
Marshall admitted that Van Tassell would testify that he had not
received a copy of the discovery papers until March 10 which
is in accord with Van Tassellfs testimony, (page 31)

The

crux of Marshall's argument for "excusable neglect is succinctly
stated in this passage:

/

"Well, that's all, is that Mr. Tuft would
testify that he told everybody that he was not
going to appear as long as the case was really
in Mr. Fullmer's hands, until he was relieved
he was not going to appear. The reason we did
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not make motions together is he did not understand
there was a trial date. He stated that his understanding was the same as Mr, Van Tassellfs, but it
was a pretrial that was coming up. Now I think
that the evidence shows that there is purely
excusable neglect." (Pages 27-28)
If this were the case that Fullmer failed to inform Mr. Tuft
of the trial date after filing a formal notice of withdrawal,
then Mr. Fullmer must be deemed grossly negligent.

It is

more likely, however, as stated in the Sykes affidavit, that
it was Tuft's strategy not to appear at the trial so that a
long continuance would be granted.
13.

As a final blow to Van Tassell, Tuft would not

represent him in the appeal unless he agreed to give to Tuft
a mortgage for $25,000. Van Tassell fled back to Fullmer for
representation knowing no other attorneys.

Fullmer in his

normal manner improperly appealed to the Supreme Court from
an Order which did not exist and which, if it had, would have
been non-appealable.

Neither Tuft nor Fullmer appealed from

the April 2, 1975, judgment which would have allowed Van Tassell
to raise questions on the merit concerning the admissions made
by Flick as to certain amounts owing to Van Tassell.
The preceeding examples illustrate the gross negligence
conducted by Mr. Fullmer and Mr. Tuft in the representation
of Van Tassell.

If this were not bad enough, Van Tassell

was represented by the partner of one of the negligent
lawyers in the only evidentiary hearing held to examine
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the reasons for the default.

An examination of this trans-

cript clearly shows that the conduct of Tuft was never
touched upon and that the conduct of Fullmer preceeding
the default and the discovery problems was not examined in
any detail whatsoever.

Appellant's new counsel would submit

that both Fullmer and Marshall attempted to conceal the
gross injustice which had been perpetrated on Van Tassell.
For this reason, as stated previously, the trial court was
correct in finding no excusable neglect and had no other
course of action open to it from the evidence presented at
this hearing.
Therefore, Appellants submit that the supplemented records
before this Court is sufficient for a finding that the default
judgment should be set aside. As stated in defendant's
affidavit, there have been only minor judgments and other
law suits brought against defendant since the time of this
judgment and unless plaintiffs can show to the contrary, there
will be no harm to the plaintiffs by proceeding to trial on
the merits.

In the alternative, appellants would request

that a full evidentiary hearing be held in the District Court
with the opportunity of appellants to cross-examine the
various parties to this matter so that the trial court may
have a full disclosure of the events leading to the default
and the subsequent events thereafter.

The only other alterna-

tive, that of a malpractice action against the attorneys,
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is totally inadequate in light of the amount of award and
irreparable harm which would occur to Van Tassell during the
pendency of such a suit.

CONCLUSION
All of the reasons as outlined in respondent's brief
supporting the default and outlined in his argument at the
hearing (p. 29-31) as seen from an examination of the affidavits
filed in this case by the defendant and his family and also by
an attorney practicing with Mr. Tuft at the.time, shows that
these occurrences were solely caused by the negligence and
gross neglect of either Mr. Fullmer or Mr. Tuft or both.
Failure to attend trial, the failure to move for a continuance,
and the failure to respond to discovery were all caused by the
attorneys; not by the client.

While litigation must have

finality, a judgment, especially of this size and magnitude,
must be based upon a full disclosure of the reasons giving rise
to the judgment.

Through the conduct of these attorneys in the

trial court a full opportunity to review the record was
never given.

It is ludicrous to think that a man such as

Mr. Van Tassell would jeopardize his assets by ignoring
repeated orders of the Court and by failing to attend a
trial in which he had a substantial interest both in losing
and in gaining.

The more logical assumption must be, therefore,

that for whatever reasons, Mr. Van Tassell was misled and
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and misinformed by his attorneys who he relied upon to
represent him in this litigation.

Since the only damage

done to plaintiffs would be the cost of this litigation up
to this point, a cost which appellants would gladly pay, and
since there is no showing on any prejudice resulting from the
setting aside of this judgment, justice requires a reversal
as a matter of law of the Court's order or, at the least,
an opportunity for a full hearing as to the conduct of the
parties.
Respectfully submitted,

._'..
v ;

WORSLEY, SNOW & CHRISTENSEN
Craig S. Cook
Michael R. Carlston
701 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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APPENDIX

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT SYKES
AFFIDAVIT OF GLEN VAN TASSELL
AFFIDAVIT OF ERMA VAN TASSELL
AFFIDAVIT OF JOY VAN TASSELL
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GEORGE W. FLICK,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

AFFIDAVIT OF
ROBERT SYKES

vs.
GLEN VAN TASSELL and VAN'S
SERVICE, INC., a corporation,

Case No. 14154

Defendants-Appellants.

STATE OF UTAH

}
: ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Robert Sykes, after being first duly sworn, deposes
and says:
1.

I am a practicing and licensed lawyer in the

State of Utah.
2.

From late March through early June, 1975 I was

associated with Tuft and Marshall, attorneys at law, on
a percentage basis.
3.

On approximately March 21st, I was told by

Mr. Tuft to read the file in the FJLick vs. Van Tassell
case and to give my opinion as to what should be done.
4.

During my first week of work, I learned that a

default judgment had been entered against Glen Van Tassell
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in excess of $250,000.00,

I further learned that

Mr* Tuft did not appear on behalf of defendant at this
hearing*
5,

In conversations I had with Mr. Tuft during

late March 19 75f Mr. Tuft explained why he did not
appear at the trial. He informed me that he did not
appear because he felt the trial court would have only
given him a 2-week continuance before the trial and that
he did not feel that that was sufficient time for preparation.

He stated that for this reason he had carefully

drafted a petition for his appearance and timed it to
arrive very shortly before the trial date in order to
make it impossible for the judge to order him to try the
case on March 19th.

As part of his strategy, Mr. Tuft said that he

couched the language of the petition to make it conditional upon Mr. Fullmerfs withdrawal.

Mr. Tuft informed

me that it was also his strategy to make Mr. Van Tassell
appear to be without legal counsel on the trial date so
that Mr. Tuft would not be forced to try the case on the
19th and so that Van Tassell would be granted a substantial continuance (i.e. longer than two weeks).
6. Mr. Tuft informed me that he was surprised when the
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default was actually entered rather than a continuance
being granted.
7.

On or about April lr 1975, I first met

Mr. Van Tassell personally.

On this and several

subsequent occasions he informed me and Mr. Tuft that he
had not been told by anyone that he need come to court
on the trial date.
8.

During the two weeks prior to April 23rd, I

asked Mr. Tuft what should be done to prepare for the
April 24th Motion to set aside the default.

I was told

by Mr. Tuft not to do any more on the case until we were
paid the balance of $2,000,00 allegedly due from
Van Tassell.

On the evening of April 23rd at approxi-

mately 5:00 p.m. I telephoned Mr. Tuft and Mr. Marshall
at Murdock Engineering in Clearfield.

I asked Mr. Tuft

if he would be arguing the Motion on the 24th and if I
should do anything in preparation for it. He said I
should speak with John Marshall about it. John Marshall,
his law partner, told me that he would probably argue
the Motion himself and that I should do a memorandum in
support of the Motion.

I expressed my reservations

about having John do the argument since he was not as
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familiar with the facts of the case as were Mr. Tuft and
myself.

I had previously expressed my concern to

Mr. Tuft that he appear and argue the Motion himself.
9.

During that night and into the early hours of

April 24th, I researched the law concerning the setting
aside of default judgments and prepared a memorandum of
points and authorities.

The memorandum was typed early

on the morning of the 24th.

I drove with Mr. Marshall

from Salt Lake to Bountiful and gave him a brief recitation of the facts and the law of the case. When we
arrived in Farmington,
present.

Mr. Tuft and Mr. Van Tassell were

When I saw Mr. Tuft I thought he was now going

to argue the Motion but he soon stated that he would
probably

leave and that it would be better anyway if

John Marshall argued the Motion for him.

He stated that

he had to return shortly to Murdock Engineering in
Clearfield but said that he was only 20 minutes away if
we needed him.
10;

I witnessed the argument of Mr. Marshall and

the entire proceeding that day and believe that
Mr. Marshall did an excelleht. job under the circumstances.

However, because he did not have the time to
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familiarize himself with the complex facts of the case,
I do not believe he was able to adequately show the
conduct of Van Tassell and his attorneys as to the
discovery delays and the failure to attend the trial.
11.

It is my opinion that crucial lines of testi-

mony were not explored or adequately presented to the
Court by Mr. Marshall

(through no real fault of his own)

or by Mr. Findley and that the trial court was not fully
advised as to what actually happened concerning the
events leading to the default judgment.
12.

It is my belief that defendant has a valid

defense and counterclaim against plaintiff.
13. I have since left the employment of M r , Tuft
and am now practicing law with another firm in Salt Lake
City.

Robert Sykes

/

/ 0 &, ..
<W

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

day

_,—JZ

of February, 1976.
/)
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GEORGE W.

FLICK,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

AFFIDAVIT OF
GLEN VAN TASSELL

vs.
GLEN VAN TASSELL a n d

VAN'S

SERVICE, INC., a corporation,

Case No. 14154

Defendants-Appellants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss.

Glen Van Tassell, after being first duly sworn,
deposes and says:
1.

That I am the individual defendant in the

above-entitled case and am the major shareholder and
President of Van's Service, Inc.
2.

In December of 1973 I was served with a

Complaint in the above-entitled action and immediately
contacted Attorney Boyd Fullmer to represent me in this
matter.
3.

During a large part of 1974 I commuted between

Bountiful, Utah and Bancroft,• Idaho and spent approximately six out of seven days in Idaho.

I was reachable

by telephone and within three hours of each location.
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I worked with only my son during this period,
4.

While in Idahof I did not personally receive

any notices that my deposition was to be taken prior to
February 4, 19 74 but I believe my wife was served with
some kind of papers in January 1974 and, since I was in
Idaho, I instructed her to deliver the papers to my
attorney, Boyd Fullmer,

I was never informed by

Mr. Fullmer of any date for my deposition other than
February 4f 1974 and never requested him to reschedule
my deposition because of my cattle business,
5.

At the time of my deposition Mr. Fullmer had

the only copies of the Idaho mining claims contract and
he agreed to give plaintiff's attorney a copy at the
time of my deposition,
6.

During the entire course of proceedings up

until the early part of Marchf 19 75 I was never shown or
informed by Mr. Fullmer that I was to answer the
Interrogatories submitted by plaintiff's counsel on
June 24, 1974 nor was I requested to supply information.
1.

I was never informed by Mr. Fullmer that I was

to produce documents listed' in a July 15, 1974 Order of
Judge Thornley Swan nor was I informed that I was to pay
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$100,00 attorney's fee for Mr. Fullmerfs failure to
attend the trial.
8.

While it is true that I went on a world tour in

July and August of 1974rMr. Fullmer knew that I would
leave for this trip three months before,and I consulted
Mr. Fullmer and asked him if there were anything I should
do before leaving, and he informed me that there was
nothing to do at that time.
9.

I was never informed by Mr. Fullmer in

September of 19 74 that an Order was entered by Judge
Gould commanding me to answer the June 24 Interrogatories
by October 20, 19 74.
10.

I was never informed by Mr. Fullmer of the

Request for Admissions filed by plaintiff's attorney on
October 17, 19 74 or the Request for Production of
certain documents filed upon the same day until the
early part of Marchf 19 75 and was told then they need
not be answered or produced.
11.

I never authorized Mr. Fullmer to object to

answering the admissions or producing the documents.
While it is true that I was' in Idaho I had available two
telephone numbers at which Mr. Fullmer could reach mer
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had continual mail service, and was only four hours away
from my Utah residence and would have been willing to
come to Utah upon Mr. Fullmerfs request had I been so
informed,
12,

I was never informed by Mr, Fullmer that

plaintiff's attorney was again moving for sanctions for
failure to comply with discovery and that he was seeking
attorney1s fees of $800,00 as outlined in his Motion of
November 15, 1974.
13,

I asked Mr, Fullmer if we could make a claim

against plaintiff for the amount owing to me of approximately $200,000.00 on the mining claims which I sold
plaintiff, for half of the amount necessary to perform
the annual assessment work, and for the defamation of
defendant's character by plaintiff.

Mr. Fullmer

informed me that he filed a Counterclaim concerning all
of these claims.
14,

I was not informed by Mr. Fullmer of the

December 18, 1974 Order entered by Judge Swan ordering
that sanctions be imposed for failure to answer the
Interrogatories, Admissions, and Production of Documents
which I was still unaware even existed.
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15.

I never received nor was informed of the

existence of a document known as "Notice of Motion"
dated February 19, 1975 informing Mr. Fullmer that a
Motion to strike my Answer would be entered for failure
to respond to discovery.
16.

I personally never received a "Notice to

Appoint Counsel" dated February 28, 1975 which was
submitted by plaintiff's attorney.

I do remember that

I was in Idaho during that period and talked to my wife
about a letter which had come from the plaintiff's law
firm.

She asked me what to do with it and I told her to

take the letter to Mr. Fullmer.

I am informed that my

daughter delivered this letter to Mr. Fullmerfs office.
17.

I was not informed by Mr. Fullmer that an

Order had been entered by Judge Swan on March 4, 1975 to
strike my Answer if discovery was not completed by
March 14th.
18.

Sometime in the middle or end of February

Mr. Fullmer informed me that he did not think he had
sufficient time to try my case in the latter part of
March and wanted to withdraw.
19.

I agreed he should withdraw.

He recommended
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that I retain Mr. Reed Tuft as my new attorney. A
meeting was held with Mr. Tuft in the latter part of
February or the first part of March at which time Mr.
Tuft informed me that he would handle my case presuming
that I paid him at least $2f000.00. Mr. Tuft told me not
to worry about anything and that he was going to get an
extension from the March 19th date which he said was a
pretrial and that the court would grant additional time.
Fullmer concurred in this statement.
20.

On this same day Mr. Fullmer delivered my file

to Mr. Tuft.

Mr. Fullmer showed Mr. Tuft the

Interrogatories, and Requests.

This was the first time

I was shown these documents. Mr. Tuft informed me that
there was no point in answering them at that time since
a continuance would be granted by the trial court.

I

was perfectly willing and able to try to answer those
questions had Mr. Tuft advised me to do so.
'.21.

I was not informed of Judge Swan's denial of

Fullmer1s Motion for a Continuance nor that the admissions
would be deemed true if not answered by March 14th.
22.

I was never informed by Mr. Fullmer of the

notice sent to him on March 12# 1975 by Mr. Findlay,
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counsel for plaintiff# noticing that plaintifffs counsel
would move for a default for a failure to respond to the
discovery request.
23.

Between March 3rd and March 19th I repeatedly

called both Mr. Tuft and Mr. Fullmer.

I was told by

Mr. Fullmer to do whatever Mr. Tuft requested.

Mr. Tuft

informed me that it would be unnecessary for me to
attend the March 19th trial and told me to tell anyone
who asked me that it was my understanding that it was a
pretrial. Mr. Tuft requested that I go to his office
during this period and I did go to his office on three
or four occasions.

Upon each time, however# he merely

asked me for more money and informed me that I need not
worry as long as I pay him the money.

I paid him

$1#700.00.
24.

On approximately March 18th I again called

Mr. Fullmer and asked him if I needed to attend the
hearing and he said don't attend it if Tuft tells you
not to.

He stated it was his understanding that I was

not to come.

I called Mr. Tuft and he told me not to

worry about it and to be sure to say that it was my
understanding that it was a pretrial if anyone asked.

I

did not know the distinction between a pretrial and tria
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He said that he would take care of everything and would
let me know what to do.

I presumed Tuft would appear

personally at the hearing.
25.

On March 19, 1975 I was at my Bountiful

residence and would have been available for trial within
one hour after being notified had my counsel telephoned
me.
26.

On March 20, 1975 I called Mr. Tuft and asked

him what had developed.

He informed me it was under

advisement and to call him in three or four days.

No

mention of any "judgment" was made in the conversation
and I was unclear what was being considered.
27.

I talked to Fullmer two or three days later

and was informed by him that a judgment had been entered
against me on March 19.

I was very upset and immedi-

ately called Tuft and he said a judgment had been
entered but that it would be set aside.

He told me not

to worry and that he would take care of it if I sent him
more money.
28.

On April 1st I went to the offices of Reed

Tuft to sign a document he had prepared for me.

I asked

him why he said in the documents I had moved my residence
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to Idaho when I was still living in Bountiful and he
explained that residence was a legal term and that I was
now technically residenced in Idaho.

I also told him it

was rare that I could not be reached by telephone but he
said that wasn't important and not to worry about it.
29.

I told Mr. Tuft that I did not consider myself

unable to communicate with Mr. Fullmer or that there was
any tension between us as stated in the documents.

He

informed me that Mr. Fullmer believed there was such a
failure and tension and therefore it was proper for me
to make this statement since Mr. Fullmer would not.

I

was surprised at this representation but was assured
that it wasn't important either.
30.

I told him I didn't understand or know the

information contained in the last part of the paper
concerning Tuft's reasons, not having counsel, and
prejudice but was told by Tuft that it was just a
formality and that this was "lawyer talk."
31.

Mr. Tuft toId.me to sign the document in two

places and that it would be submitted to the court.

I

signed the document as instructed by Mr. Tuft but did
not understand why it was necessary for me to sign it or
that it was like testifying in court.
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32.

Around April 23rd I was informed by Mr. Tuft

to go to the Davis County Courthouse the next day where
a hearing would be held to set aside the judgment.

He

told me not to worry# that everything would be taken
care of.
33.

On April 24th I met Mr. Tuft# Mr. Marshall,

his law partner, and Mr. Sykes, an associate, at the
courthouse doors. Mr. Marshall stated that he was not
prepared to handle it. Mr. Tuft told Mr. Marshall that
it would work better without Mr. Tuft present and that
Marshall should do the best that he could.

As we were

leaving Mr. Tuft told me to be sure to testify that the
March 19th proceeding was a pretrial.
34.

At the hearing I testified as best I could

although I had not gone over the dates with any
attorneys prior to my entering the room.

I told the

court that I thought it was a pretrial on March 19th as
Mr. Tuft had instructed me to do and truthfully told the
court that I did not know the difference between a
pretrial and a trial.
35.

Around May 15th Mr. Tuft told me he would

continue to represent me in the case if I would give him
a $25,000.00 mortgage on my property as security for his
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attorney's fees,

I told him that I would not do that

and he informed me to seek other counsel,
36.

I then contacted Mr. Fullmer who said he would

represent ma on the appeal.
37.

To my best information and belief I have paid

Mr. Fullmer approximately $5,000.00 to handle this litigation from its inception to the appeal.
38.

Since March 19th I have had judgments obtained

against me for less than $5,000.00 although one such
judgment was entered by default since Mr. Fullmer failed
to respond.

I presently have pending other lawsuits in

which the maximum potential recovery is approximately
$10,000.00.
39.

My assets greatly exceed these liabilities.

I have been fully advised by my counsel that

the signing of this document is the same as testifying
in court under oath and I have carefully reviewed this
Affidavit and believe that it accurately reflects what
really happened during the proceedings of this case.

AiL /)SL«,£P
Glen Van Tassell
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

/
j.^Xft- day
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MAMA. /Mo*
NOTARY 'PUBLIC
Residing at
My Commission Expires:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GEORGE W. FLICK,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

AFFIDAVIT OF
ERMA VAN TASSELL

vs.
GLEN VAN TASSELL a n d

VAN'S

SERVICE, INC., a corporation,

Case No. 14154

Defendants-Appellants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss.

Erma Van Tassell, after being first duly sworn,
deposes and says:
1.

That I am the wife of Glen Van Tassell,

defendant in the above-entitled action.
2.

That my husband was frequently in Idaho during

the proceedings of this lawsuit.
3.

In the early part of 1974 I was served with

papers.

I talked to my husband who was in Idaho who

told me to deliver them to Boyd Fullmer since he would
know what to do with them.

I either gave them to my

daughter or son for delivery or mailed them to Mr. Fullmer.
4.

That on several occasions documents arrived in
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letters with law firm letterheads to our residence in
Bountiful.
5.

I generally did not open these letters.

To the best of my memory I received one such

letter from the law firm of Nielsen, Conder, Henriod &
Gottfredson, who I knew to be the firm representing
Mr. Flick.
6.

That upon receipt of this letter I contacted my

husband in Idaho and he informed me that I should send
it to Mr. Fullmer immediately.
7.

I gave this letter to my daughter Joy and told

her to take it to Mr. Fullmer.
8.

Upon return she informed me that she had

delivered it to his office.

\&A^y^

L'O™

J*<*^°-~^

Erma Van Tassell
Subscribed and Sworn to before me this / l/M day
of February, 1976.

.

loMJJb i^y
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at

My Commission Expires:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GEORGE W. FLICK,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

AFFIDAVIT OF
JOY VAN TASSELL

vs.
GLEN VAN TASSELL and VAN\S
SERVICE, INC., a corporation,

Case No. 14154

Defendants-Appellants,

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
COUNTY OF SALT )
Joy Van Tassell, after being first duly sworn,
deposes and says:
1.

That I am the daughter of the defendant Glen

Van Tassell.
2.

That on several occasions I delivered documents

to Mr. Boyd Fullmer1s office.
3.

That I cannot specifically remember what

documents I delivered but believe that I made one such
trip sometime in the latter part of February or early
March.
Uk

Jt-rtA

j'ffrp**-

*> Joy
oy Van
van Tassell
Tass<

S u b s c r i b e d and sworn t o b e f o r e me t h i s
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day

of February/ 19 76.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at
My Commission Expires:
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